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Abstract
Network and information security continues to be one of the largest areas that require greater
attention and improvement over the current state of infrastructure within enterprise information
systems. Intruders to enterprise networks are no longer just hacking for fun or to show off their
programming skills; rather they are now doing it for profit-making motives. As a result,
developing profiles for the behavior of intruders, trespassing upon business information systems
within an enterprise networking environment, has become a primary focus of cyber-security
research recently. In the proposed on-going project, we deploy a novel honeynet system using
advanced virtualization technologies, in order to collect the forensic evidence of an attack, by
allowing attackers to interact with compromised computers in a real enterprise network. We then
analyze the behavior of intruders in order to investigate and compare their hidden linkages as
compared with enterprise networks, and the attacker(s)’ potential group structures, including
attributes such as geographic distribution and service communities, thus providing strategies for
enterprise-network administrators to stay protected against malicious attacks from external
intruders. Preliminary results on the proposed research is very promising, showing intruders’
behaviors over one month were distributed across over 60 different countries, and our work
demonstrated that the most popular service intruders like use to interact with is the very HTTP
Web itself.
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1. Introduction
Honeynets provide an information-gathering approach to security; they are used to gather
information about threats in the network. A honeynet is an interactive type of honeypot which
provides real systems and application for intruders to attack and thus captures real information
on a real attack. A honeynet is based on the idea of deception (Warkentin 2006), in that the
hackers are tricked into thinking that they are interacting with the real production systems; hence
they can do all the damage thinking that they are not being watched.
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That collected information is then used for improving the detection, defense, and mitigation
techniques employed against those monitored types of attacks. In this context honeynets are not
only important for attracting attackers so as to capture great amounts information on the
activities of the black-hat community, but a honeynet project in the enterprise system can help
the information system manger enforcing better security policies on the basis of vulnerabilities
found by honeynet, thus developing different security aspects involved in setting up and
maintaining a honeynet on a digitalized enterprise networking system (Romney et al. 2005).
In the enterprise information system, honeypots are typically used to add another layer of
security to the network, as more-conventional firewalls and network-intrusion detection systems
(NIDS) have some limitations including, for example: (1) The network firewall placed at the
network’s external interface to the Internet cannot protect hosts within the corporation from
threats that originate within the corporate network (intranet attacks), and (2) some attacks can
manage to bypass the firewall, while the NIDSs usually suffer from large numbers of false
positives and false negatives (Russell 2000). The increasing use of encryption also reduces the
amount of useful information that can be collected within a NIDS; plus, a NIDS may fail to
detect new attacks having signatures unknown in its forensic database (Provos and Holz 2007).
Therefore deploying a honeynet to capture real attacker actions can help acquire the information
missed by the firewall and NIDS. Furthermore, this information can be used to refine NIDS
rules, in order to reduce the number of false positives, thus helping to deploy stronger security
measures for protecting enterprise information system from internal threats (Honeynet 2004).
Toward the assistance of government regulations regarding information security, the collected
information by a honeynet on an enterprise network is very useful for fighting and identifying
criminals such as those precipitating distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, spamming,
phishing, keylogging, click fraud, as well as identify theft and information ex-filtration.
Precedent has shown that such recorded evidence regarding what intruders are doing, and what
their ultimate goals are, can be brought up in court toward convicting intruders of the enterprise
network. Moreover predicting intruders’ actions on the basis of data collected by the honeynet
can mitigate the risks of being attacked.
One of the big challenges in deploying honeynets on an enterprise system is how costly and
difficult-to-maintain they can be, when there are many different real systems and applications
involved. In this research-in-progress, we propose a novel virtual-honeynet system based on the
advanced hardware-virtualization (VM) technologies in which the fingerprinting of the honeypot
systems cannot be spied out by intruders, thus protecting the whole honeynet system from direct
attack by those very intruders it seeks to study.

2. Overview of Honeypot and Honeynet
Honeypots can be classified into two major groups, namely low-interaction honeypots, and highinteraction honeypots. The difference between these two classes is the extent to which the
attacker is allowed to interact with the system. As the words suggest, a low-interaction honeypot
keeps suspected-attacker contact with the physical system to a minimum, by way of emulated
systems and applications for the attacker to target and typically the use of mere scripts to respond
to the intruders activities. The major advantage of low-interaction honeypots is that they are
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simple to make and easier to deploy, and the information gathered is mostly statistical data on
port-scan and worm attacks, plus new and ongoing attack patterns. A high-interaction honeypot
on the other hand, is the one that uses real systems and applications to interact with the attackers.
A network which employs honeypots of this type is what we call a honeynet. These are simply
systems running real operating systems such as Windows Server, Linux that are placed on a real
network as honeypots and then exposed (but not via the usual contrived weaknesses) to the
hackers to be attacked. A great deal of valuable information can be collected from the attackers’
high degree of interaction with such a honeynet. For the accuracy and integrity of the data
collected, the honeynet systems should not be intentionally compromised (or configured) in any
way that will advertise them to or make them more vulnerable to attackers (Currant 2005).
Limitations with high-interaction honeypots are high maintenance and close monitoring, as well
as the need to analyze the attacker’s behaviors and attempt to find the motivation of their attacks,
which can be quite time consuming.
A physical honeynet is one in which the honeypots applications are running on separate physical
machines, rather than being run as several virtual hosts in a single physical machine; in contrast
to a physical honeynet, a virtual honeynet is a technology that virtually implements many
different operating systems in one hardware computer, and hence rather than having a honeynet
containing different physically separate honeypots, all the honeypots will be virtually housed in
one machine and still appear to the attacker as different separate machines. The main advantage
of using a virtual honeynet over a classic physical honeynet is the cost of equipment: a virtual
honeynet often needs only one physical machine, rather than requiring the security researcher to
buy many physical machines and their connecting equipment. It is also easy to manage since all
the honeypots are configurable in-and-from one physical machine.
There are two typical types of virtual honeynets: one is self-contained and the other one is
hybrid. The self-contained virtual honeynet is where the whole honeynet, which includes
honeypots and the honeywall and any other data control and data capture tools, is contained in
only one physical computer. It is advantageous because it is portable to carry the whole honeynet
around from place to place. Furthermore using only one hardware device cuts much on the cost
of buy-ing many separate computers. The main drawback of self-contained honeynet however is
that since all the services are run in one machine if that machine fails or is compromised then the
whole honeynet is gone, and if the attacker detects they are interacting with a self-contained
virtual honeynet they can then attack other parts like the firewall, the IDS since they are all in the
same system. Also there is going to be a great need of memory and CPU power in that machine,
hence the cost of upgrading its CPU and memory may be too high.
We are therefore proposing a new type of hybrid-virtual honeynet, in which control and capture
of data are implemented in physically separate machines and the honeypots are then run virtually
on the same computer. This approach is more robust than the purely physical, self-contained
honeynet model, and is very flexible as there are no limitations on the type of technologies to use
for data control and data capture.

3. The Proposed Virtual Honeynet
Figure 1 illustrates the networking topology of our honeynet architecture, following which we
describe the main functions for each component.
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Figure 1. Hybrid Virtual Honeynet Architecture and Technology

3.1 Data Control
Data control is the most important function when implementing a honeynet, as this function is
providing an environment for the attacker to carry out the attack activities, with as much freedom
as possible, and without noticing that he or she is interacting with a honeynet. Data control of a
honeynet also has to prevent the attacker to use the honeynet from targeting other non-honeynet
machines either by mistake (if the intruder means only to target computers on the single network)
or intentionally, even when the honeynet itself is compromised. In our virtual honeynet we
implement different data-control layers (such as counting outbound connections, intrusion
prevention gateways, or bandwidth restrictions), so that our system can avoid a single point-offailure, especially for new types of attacks. This module also ensures that our honeynet blocks all
outbound connections to the real production systems (or to the rest of the Internet, for that matter)
in the event of software or hardware failures within the honeynet.

3.2 Data Capture
Data-capture functionality attempts to record as much data and details (metadata) as possible
from the attackers’ actions by monitoring and logging all their activities while ensuring that such
monitoring is imperceptible to the intruder. All activities must be captured including activities on
the network, against the honeynet hosts, as well as those activities that originate within the
4

honeynet. One of the major challenges faced by data-capture is the use of encryption (e.g. in
SSH sessions) by the black-hat community. Merely sabotaging the honeypot’s ability to receive
encrypted packets by shortening the length of its public session-keys would be too conspicuous
to attackers. Likewise producing weak public session-keys though reducing the quality of their
hash upon the private key would still be too obvious, as well. This means that encrypted data has
to be captured in the unencrypted form. This can obviously be done by simply trying to break
(brute-force) the public session-keys and then decrypt the data, but to do so is exceedingly
difficult because the attacker expects us to be using keys of sufficient length (e.g. 256-bit or
more). Another approach is to capture the data post-decryption within the honeypot’s operating
system, which is indeed the technique used by the kernel-based Sebek tool used for data-capture
by the honeynet project. Using different layers to capture this data can be beneficial since if one
system missed some details, then it remains possible for us to capture the packets with one the
others. Also, if the attacker is able to detect that he or she is being monitored, and tries to bring
down the capturing tool (e.g. by disabling or bypassing Snort somewhere) then we are still able
to capture those details, and others, with the remaining tools. In our honeynet we apply Sebek,
IDSs, and firewall logs, to conduct data capture.

3.2.1 Using the Sebek data-capture tool
Sebek is a data capturing tool that resides in kernel space and is able to capture some data on
user activities as they access the system. It is able to copy most or the entire intruder’s activities
from the honeypot(s) and transfer it over the honeynet network to the honeywall anonymously
without the intruder detecting this. The Sebek tool does keystroke logging for encrypted
sessions, and it is able to retrieve passwords that intruders use for remote logins, retrieve input of
keys to decrypt the encrypted data, and to recover files copied over Session-Control Protocol
(SCP) (Dornseif, 2004). When encryption is not used, it is easier to get the intruder’s keystroke
actions and user output details using a tool like Ethreal which can sniff packets in the wire and
then do some stream reassembly to determine the TCP sessions of the intruder. Using Sebek in
the operating system’s kernel space enables administrators to capture any intruder’s activities
regardless of what binaries the intruders are using for decryption. Also because user space is
separate from kernel space, the Sebek instance can be hidden from all users, including those with
root privileges.

3.2.2 An intrusion-detection system
In our honeynet we use Snort, an open-source Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to monitor and
log all traffic in the honeynet. Snort sits between the honeynet and the external network,
examining and reporting (including generating alerts) all traffic according to a pre-defined
configuration of rules. In our honeynet project, Snort is set to a full-logging mode so that it
captures all the IP packets, plus TCPdump is employed to capture all the network traffic in
binary format. So whenever the snort instance fails, the data missed is still fully recorded by
TCPdump. Another type of IDS we deploy is Bro, the functions of which are mostly anomalydetection-based, and can be used to complement Snort though capturing additional details, as
well as for correlation of results.

3.2.3 Firewall logging
The firewall monitors all traffic entering and leaving the honeynet, so logs of this traffic can
provide very useful data for analysis (e.g. an attempted backdoor access to the honeynet). The
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firewall is able to log the failed or refused connections, which means that some details missed by
other tools can be apprehended by these logs.

4. Deployment and Analysis
There are three options for where we can place our honeynet in the target network, relative to
other networking devices, which are either externally facing the Internet, internally behind the
firewall, or in the demilitarized-zone (DMZ) subnet (Grimes 2005). Each of these locations has
their own advantages and disadvantages, and the choice depends on factors including amount of
network resources the enterprise has, and the objectives of deploying a honeynet.
For example, a research-based institution that wants to capture as much hacker details as possible
will likely put their honeynet externally, whereas an organization that wants to have up-to-date
details of the possible exploits to their production systems will likely place their honeynet
internally. The expertise of the administrators can also be a factor in this decision, as some
deployments are more complex than others.
In this ongoing research project we place our honeynet on the enterprise DMZ, in the same subnet alongside some legitimate public access DMZ servers (e.g. web and email servers), thus
being able to capture early details of attacks to devices on the DMZ. Deploying honeynet in the
DMZ subnet enforces more robust data-control measures compared to the other two options, as
doing so works by way of placing an additional router between the honeynet and the DMZ
firewall for controlling the outgoing connections from the honeypots, and therefore the
production networks protected behind the DMZ are at less risk of being attacked.
We run our honeynet on an enterprise network for one month during which we received more
than 200,000 packets. The total number of unique source IP addresses reaching our honeynet was
originated from 62 countries. Most of the IP addresses belong to United States and China. Port
80 was the most common destination port according to our experimental analysis of the honeynet
traffic collected over one month, i.e. the most popular service hackers like to interact with is port
80, as that is the port assigned to HTTP traffic, the basis of the World Wide Web.

5. Conclusions
In this proposed continuation of our research-in-progress, we aim to investigate existing work in
the area of forensics upon individual hackers and hackers’ organizational structures, in order to
develop a novel hybrid-virtual honeynet technique with which to collect the forensic evidence of
attacks by allowing attackers to interact with compromised computers in a real enterprise
network. To the best of our knowledge, we believe the proposed work is the first attempt to
address a key gap in the discipline of Network Security, by mapping the linkages between the
characteristics of attacking traffic and their possible structure hidden behind, thus allowing the
average enterprise systems-administrator to keep protected against malicious attacks from
computer intruders.
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